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Pragmatic Causation∗
ANTONY EAGLE†
Abstract Two arguments due to Russell are examined, and found to show
that the notion of causation as full determination doesn’t mesh easily with
deterministic global physics and the distinction between effective and in-
effective strategies. But a local notion of causation as involving a certain
kind of counterfactual dependence is, I argue, compatible with Russell’s
conclusions. I defend it from a resurgent form of Russell’s microphysical
determinism argument by deploying a pragmatic account of the nature and
function of scientific theories.
1. Russell’s Arguments
The law of causality. . . like much that passes muster among philoso-
phers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only
because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm. (Russell, 1913
[1963], 132)
Russell (1913 [1963]) takes the relation of causation to be a relation of deter-
mination: c causes e just when c determines e to occur. This relation is asymmet-
ric and plausibly transitive. The fundamental law of causality is supposed to be
that every event has a sufficient cause, one that is guaranteed to bring that event
about and in fact did so. This intuition about the deterministic nature of causation
is not a Russellian idiosyncrasy: it originates in Hume’s ‘constant conjunction’
regularity analysis (if c and e are constantly conjoined, the appearance of c should
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be sufficient for the appearance of e), and even later accounts like Suppes (1970)
keep the idea that individual causes partially determine their effects, and deny that
every event has a sufficient cause to avoid the supposed ‘universal law’.
Russell thinks that this notion of causation as a determination relation between
events doesn’t appear in physics, and hence should be jettisoned from a properly
scientific world view. Field (2003) identifies two arguments in Russell to this
conclusion. The first rests on the claim that the equations of microphysics are
bi-deterministic. If we fix the global microphysical state s of some system R at t,
that fixes the whole trajectory of R through the space of states both before and af-
ter t.1 If all macroscopic events are constituted by some particular microphysical
states, then fixing a particular event in the system at a time will determine which
microphysical trajectory the system is on, and hence which events will occur and
have occurred. Then any event determines both its temporal antecedents and tem-
poral succedents. But if ‘c causes e’ is defined in Russell’s sense—namely, c
determines e—then by this argument e equally well causes c. The asymmetry of
determination, and hence the asymmetry of cause and effect, is lost. There seems
no place in bi-deterministic physics for the causal asymmetry.
This argument has at least two flaws. Firstly, though it might be true that the
causal asymmetry is not an asymmetry of determination, causation still might be
defined from a relation of determination combined with an asymmetrical relation
(where the asymmetry comes from somewhere else). Perhaps the asymmetry is
that of entropy increase, plausibly set by unusually low entropy initial conditions.2
Perhaps it is a brute temporal asymmetry.
Secondly, it may still be the case that there is a macroscopic asymmetry be-
tween causes and effects. Perhaps on a global scale, the whole state of the universe
at one time determines the whole state at every other time. However, if we restrict
our attention to a local particular event c, presumably there are many global states
that can have this event as a constituent part.3 Perhaps all the global trajectories
which feature this event in some state have some further event e as a feature of a
state; but perhaps not all the global trajectories which feature e have c as a feature.
So the occurrence of c determines the occurrence of e in a way that e doesn’t de-
termine the occurrence of c. Focussing attention on a limited area might very well
give us an asymmetry of determination between particular events. Moreover, it is
1Earman (1986).
2Albert (2000).
3This is so whether or not properties of such parts exhaust or fix the properties of the global
state—I’m not relying on any supervenience theses.
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arguable that this local determination is exactly what the original intuitive notion
of a cause was supposed to capture.
The notion of a local event is a tricky one. At least, it must involve loca-
tion within some spatiotemporally small area. Maybe it also has to be centered
on some salient event, or on the location of the agent who characterises events
as local. But I want something slightly stronger: something like ‘epistemically
local’: macroscopically describable, medium sized, readily distinguishable from
other events going on around it (hence discrete). One aspect of locality is that
these events are easily subsumed within familiar and natural (to us) delineations
of the categories of events. I take it to be a feature of our commonsense causal
language that effects and causes are both local in this way.
Russell’s other argument picks up on this conception of causation between lo-
cal events. Consider some small local events c and e such that the occurrence of c
determines the occurrence of e but not vice versa. Russell’s argument is that these
local events won’t be the kind of things we typically take to be related by cause
and effect. Consider a putative causal relationship between the firing of some gun
F and the death of a victim D. These events are clearly too particular to get into
the determination relation, because F can occur without D, if the bullet misses
the victim, or if someone else intercepts the bullet, or if the bullet explodes harm-
lessly in mid air.4 The problem with local determination is that there is always the
chance of some interference from outside the local area at the time of the cause.
To ensure that the cause guarantees the occurrence of the effect, we shall have to
hold the cause to be a very large set of events, perhaps the whole past cone of
potential causal influence on the effect. So if c really is a determinant of e, c will
have to be incredibly more complex and larger than causes are typically taken to
be.
To really determine e, we shall have to make sure that all possible interfering
events don’t occur, which will mean specifying the events which actually fill the
location of those potential interferers. But this will involve some events that are
intuitively not causes being counted as causes simply by virtue of their being in
a potentially causally efficacious location. Indeed, we shall be unable to make a
distinction as regards causal efficacy with respect to these events—in particular,
we shall not be able to distinguish the genuine from the merely potential causes
from a set of events each of which occupies a particular kind of location. If we
can’t distinguish a genuine cause from an actual non-cause that might have been
a preventer, then we shall be unable to engage in goal directed activities which
4And vice versa, if the victim dies from another gunshot wound, as in preempted shootings.
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depend on effectively bringing about certain states of affairs. This is partly be-
cause the set of events we shall have to manage or intervene on is far too large
and inhomogeneous to deal with effectively. The real problem, however, is that
we shall be misled into performing actions to bring about our goals that are not
effective for achieving those goals. Cartwright (1979) emphasised this aspect of
causation when she talked of effective versus ineffective strategies.
We can put the net result of these arguments as follows. Physics gives us a
deterministic structure of the evolution of a system over time, so in physics the
notion of a cause is trivial because it counts every past event as a cause. If we
wish to apply the concept of causation to some spatiotemporally local situation,
then we can only have determination if we are willing to abandon the role of
causes in demarcating effective strategies for manipulating that situation, which is
to say if we abandon the traditional concept of causation altogether. The genuine
physical determination relation has nothing to do with the demand for effective
strategies, and any addition of some other relation having to do with such strate-
gies is redundant. If the notion is redundant in physics, it is dispensable from a
properly scientific account of the world. Since fundamental science is the arbiter
of genuine ontology, this relation of causation should be excised from our folk
ontologies: it can’t even be reduced to physics, let alone found within it.
2. Causation as partial dependence or default determination
It seems to me this is exactly the wrong conclusion to draw. Physics provides us
with full determination which would trivialise the notion of causation. But it only
trivialises that notion because we thought that causation required full determina-
tion. (Recall that it was the requirement of determination that made us include all
those pseudo-causes.) Once we recognise that there are non-trivialising relations
of partial dependence of one event on another that can serve as a respectable foun-
dation for effective strategies, we should abandon the quest for fully determining
causation. Events which are effective yet not foolproof at bringing about other
events are legitimately called causes.
One very nice scheme for capturing a relation of non-determining depen-
dence between local events is provided by the use of counterfactuals.5 Lewis
(1973a, 1979) provides a putative analysis of causal claims in terms of certain
counterfactual conditionals: roughly, c directly causes e just in case the counter-
5It is especially nice because it preserves a kind of defeasible determination, in a way that
(say) probabilistic analyses of causation do not.
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factual ¬c 2→ ¬e (‘if it hadn’t been the case that c, then it wouldn’t have been
the case that e’) is true, and is not a backtracking counterfactual. A backtracking
counterfactual typically has e depending on c, but e preceding c, e.g. ‘if it had not
been the case that the glass was broken, then it wouldn’t have been the case that
I had smashed it earlier’.6 I am supposing that excluding backtrackers captures
one of the intuitive platitudes about causation and its relation to time—for me, the
asymmetry of actual temporal dependence supports the temporal asymmetry of
counterfactual dependence. Even if you think that counterfactual analyses of cau-
sation are flawed, there does seem to be some connexion between counterfactual
reasoning and causation.
We might worry that counterfactual determination looks like full determina-
tion of e by c, especially in the marginal gloss. But that appearance is misleading.
Ordinary conditionals obey the following inference rule: α→ β ` (α∧ γ)→ β
(the rule of ‘strengthening the antecedent’). But counterfactuals do not, and the
way they don’t is instructive in this context. Typically, were I not to have fired
my gun, the victim wouldn’t have died. But were I not to have fired my gun and
someone else did, the victim would have died. But were I not to have fired my
gun, and someone else did, but they missed, the victim wouldn’t have died. And
so on. Additional considerations and factors can alter the assessed counterfactual
dependence. These additional considerations are typically potential events that we
didn’t consider in the initial attribution of causal effectiveness to the antecedent
event.7
But there are some events which make no difference when added to the an-
tecedent. Example: we don’t think that were I not to have fired, and were some
small event ϕ on Pluto to have occurred, then the victim would have died. This is
true regardless of what ϕ is. Some events, no matter what their character, are not
capable of affecting the counterfactual dependence between two other events. But
had other facts about the event ϕ been different—had it for example been located
on Earth—then some of the possible eventsϕ could have altered the consequent—
if it had been a firing of a laser ray for example. Again: if some alien had been
located on earth and had decided to perform some action ϕ in the near vicin-
6One thought is that these backtracking counterfactuals involve evidential reasoning from
symptoms to causes, though this cannot, without circularity, define backtracking.
7One situation where full determination does appear is if the antecedent and consequent events
are global states of a system. Then Γ1 2→ Γ2 cannot be defeated by affixing additional events, for
there aren’t any. Russell’s argument can be restated: given the fundamental physics we have, for
any two global states such that Γ1 2→ Γ2, there is a true counterfactual Γ2 2→ Γ1. There is thus
no asymmetry of determination, and hence no causal asymmetry.
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ity of my firing and the victim’s being shot, then some of his possible actions ϕ
could have contributed to or detracted from my action’s bringing about the vic-
tim’s death, whether or not he actually performed one of that subclass of actions.
Notice that if the alien fires his laser, he can overdetermine the victim’s death—
the victim is shot twice—yet from the point of view of whether the victim died or
not, the result is the same.
I draw three morals from this little science fiction example. First, events are
the wrong thing to be the causal relata, at least if we only consider actual events.
Events are distinct if any aspect of them is different. So the victim’s death is dif-
ferent if it is a laser-and-bullet death than if it is a mere bullet death. In fact, the
identity of the event is quite fragile and quite sensitive to actual circumstances.
Although some think that we should have a modally robust notion of event that
isn’t so sensitive, I’m quite happy to think that events are modally fragile in this
way. But since I believe I would have played a part in causing a death regardless
of the alien or not, I had better take the relata of the causal relation to be some-
thing else: maybe abstract event types, or better still random variables. A random
variable is a function from possible events to numbers, where the numbers char-
acterise certain features of the event. For example, I could characterise a certain
class of events as the relevant class of events that might have resulted from my
firing a gun, and use the random variable Death which takes value 1 if the victim
died, and 0 otherwise (and is undefined on events which aren’t relevant—where
relevant will be spelled out below). This concept ‘smooths out’ variations in the
event which do not give rise to a different value of the random variable; however,
some other random variable might be sensitive to some of those variations.8
Second, what matters to the causal importance of a random variable is if at
least one of its possible values can alter a counterfactual in which it features. For
example, I take it that the alien’s close spatiotemporal location to my shooting
is a relevant class of events, because some of the events in that location involve
him shooting a laser. That is, for some of the events A that fall into that class, a
counterfactual ¬F∧A 2→ D is true. But for this alien’s activity to be potentially
causally relevant, it doesn’t matter that actually it was not.
Thirdly, suppose I am right about the causal significance of events which po-
tentially have causal relevance to other events, due to the truth of certain counter-
factuals. Then I need to have a way of ruling out all events which have a potential
counterpart which has causal relevance. I think that this is largely a matter of con-
8This is what Field (2003) calls a ‘fairly inexact variable’, and is essentially the same notion
of variable that appears in Hitchcock (2001), Pearl (2000), and Spirtes et al. (2000).
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Figure 1: Types of variables: ordinary causal variables, such as my shooting; non-
serious possibilities, typically not included, such as the miracle bullet; unlikely
possibilities ruled out by default, such as the gun’s jamming when fired.
textual salience, just as in traditional counterfactual accounts. But I also have a
principled way of judging salience.
Let me expand. Standard counterfactual accounts have the feature that, if out-
landish enough possibilities are considered, almost any robust modal counterfac-
tual connection between events can be disrupted. If we think that A depends on
B, consideration of a miraculous intervention, or time travel, can make B happen
regardless of A. So too on this counterfactual account, and in two types of case:
(Type I) Some events are considered irrelevant, but if one were to consider them
they would have a significant potential impact;
(Type II) Some events are relevant, but only very few of their ‘values’, or ways
of occurring, have any significant impact.
Examples of the two types may be: (i) the victim’s death depends on my shooting
the gun at him, but not if a bullet would have spontaneously appeared in midair
with the same trajectory as if I had shot it; (ii) the victim’s death depends on
my shooting the gun at the victim, but not if the bullet jams in the breach. The
‘defaults’ of Menzies (unpublished) can be used to account for causal judgements
in cases of this second sort: if we have a probability distribution over the values
of a random variable, then certain probable values can be used as defaults to make
default causal judgements. (See Figure 1.)
What is going on with these counterfactual claims about possible events? I
think that when we engage in counterfactual reasoning of this sort, what we are
doing is constructing ad hoc scientific theories of the situation in question. We
make a little model which has a few parameters, and the whole theory is the class
of models compatible with the constraints we impose on the values of the pa-
rameters, including constraints imposed by the values of other parameters. Each
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individual model is a possibility for the system in question. Which parameters are
included will depend on our judgements about the physical nature of the situation
in question, about the spatiotemporal connections (signals and the like) between
the events which instantiate the variables, and on the purposes for which the model
is being built. This last point is that models that support counterfactuals are often
built to explain certain events, and that explanations are typically contrastive, set
up against a context which demands that some salient variable or relation be in-
cluded, and others may be neglected. One very important dimension of salience
for my purposes will be the locality of the event with respect to us, for this will
ensure that the variables we model are just those required to evade Russell’s ar-
gument. Counterfactual reasoning depends additionally on which possibilities the
model dictates we take seriously.9 Which events are serious possibilities for us
depends on model and context.10 In line with Stalnaker (1984), I take context
to be the information—including information about their capacities and goals—
presumed available to the agents engaged in investigation or inquiry; the context
set is the set of possible worlds compatible with this information. These are the
‘possible situations’ that the theory counsels us to consider when we wonder what
might be.
I think the difference between the type I and type II cases above is simply that
the type I cases are non-serious possibilities, and the type II cases are serious pos-
sibilities that are often not contextually salient because the disturbing values are
highly unlikely. Hence my thought is that the type I claims depend on a contex-
tual claim about model choice, i.e. which variables to include, and type II claims
depend on the plausible default range of values that a variable can take (where
plausible is to be cashed out in terms of frequency within the relevant class of
models). For causal prediction, the default range of plausible values will con-
strain the application of the model. For instance, we will judge events which are
unlikely values of their relevant variables to be not causally efficacious; though in
thinking about actual past causation, we may well discard the plausible in favour
of the actual values. But there is a choice of causal model which is made prior to
any context of application of that model to a concrete situation. The contextual
features of model selection, as opposed to model application, I am less sure what
to say about. I think that facts about actual correlation and about actual spatiotem-
poral connectability between events that are phenomenologically salient will go a
9For example, in the Lewis-Stalnaker framework (Lewis, 1973b, Stalnaker, 1968), the ‘seri-
ousness’ of a possibility depends on its similarity to actuality.
10The idea of a serious possibility comes from Levi (1980).
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long way to explaining the choice of variable. One thing to note is that the truth
of the appropriate counterfactuals will be a perfectly objective feature of a given
set of variables, even if those variables are chosen for pragmatic reasons.
Let me deploy some new terminology to summarise the 3 morals about coun-
terfactuals that I recently drew. Let the situation under consideration determine a
contextually salient theory, specifying the set of random variables V that we will
use to summarise the values of the events in question. The theory will encode
certain counterfactual dependence claims. In particular, it will encode a pattern of
mathematical dependence between parameter values for random variables. That
is, it will give us facts of the form “the value of variable Vi depends on the values
of variables Vj . . . Vk.” So, for example, the value of Death (yes (1) or no (0))
depends on the value of Fires (yes or no), and also on the value of Alien (fires,
stands by, or throws himself in the way—so variables can be more than binary-
valued). In general, however, not every variable will depend on every other: some
will be independent.
The kinds of counterfactuals we take to be true will determine exactly how the
dependency is cashed out. Call a variable V a parent of another variable U just in
case there exists some assignment of fixed values to variables in the model such
that the counterfactual “were V to have some different value v, then U would have
some different value u” comes out true, and V 6= U.11 Note that ‘grandparent’
variables are not parents: if V only acts on U through W, then the fact that W
is fixed on some value will prevent the change in V from percolating through
to U. This counterfactual (roughly equivalent to the notion of a direct cause in
Woodward (2001)) allows us to construct causal graphs as follows. Take all the
variables in V , and put them at nodes of a graph. For each Vi ∈ V , let P(Vi)
represent its parents. For each variable Vi, draw an arrow from each Vj ∈P(Vi)
to the node Vi. We will end up with a graph something like Figure 2. This is a
qualitative causal structure, and the parenthood relations are the most basic kind
of counterfactual that should be considered in causal reasoning.12
This kind of structure will be quite familiar from the causal modelling frame-
work introduced by Judea Pearl (2000) and the team of Spirtes, Glymour and
Scheines (2000). The philosophical development I have given it here is basically
11Thanks to Charles Twardy and Chris Hitchcock for help with this formulation.
12If we have in addition a probability distribution over the values of the exogenous random
variables (i.e.those with no arrow leading into them), and equations which express the numerical
dependence of the values of a variable on the parameters and values of its parents, we can turn this
qualitative causal structure into a quantitative causal model.
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Figure 2: A sample causal model of plant growth and some of its factors.
that of Hitchcock (2001) and Woodward (2001), though I hope I have made it
appear a very natural consequence of claims to which counterfactual analyses of
causation are committed.13
Consider as a simple example the model of plant growth depicted in Figure 2.
In this model, Season is binary: growing season or non-growing season, which
in turn influences the amount of sunlight (Sun) and the rainfall (Moisture). But
moisture is influenced by sunlight (causing evaporation) and whether the crop
was irrigated or not (Irrigation).14 Finally, whether pesticide is used or not also
influences the final plant growth (Growth). Some of these variables are binary,
and some are quantities (sunlight and rainfall). Different models may choose to
represent irrigation by a volume of water, not by a binary variable. Similarly,
growth may be modelled by a variable taking values of ‘increased’, ‘decreased’
or ‘same’.
Interestingly, some variables can cause by ‘omission’ (i.e. not applying pesti-
cide can negatively influence plant growth), and it may be noted that this frame-
work gives an easy way for causes by omissions to work—at least, after the gen-
eral problem of variable selection has been solved there is no special problem
of causation by omission.15 Of course, other irrelevant variables are also omis-
sions of things that might have impacted, and it is the choice of variables to model
along with judgements about salience and relevance that give content to our causal
judgements.
13There may be an interesting connexion here with Lewis’ recent account of causation as in-
fluence (2000). Lewis’ account requires that for c to influence e, there must be a range of relevant
alterations of c that are associated with relevant alterations of e. The concomitant variation of
effect variables on cause variables in the above account may capture this, as well as yielding coun-
terfactuals which give the influence a uniform treatment within the counterfactual framework.
14Irrigation and rainfall may themselves be correlated, so this model may not be perfect (since
rainfall excludes irrigation typically).
15Thanks to Brett Sherman and Karen Bennett for help with this.
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Several things are noteworthy about this approach to a counterfactual analysis
of causation. Consider Figure 2 again. The values of the variables Season and
Irrigation are not counterfactually dependent on anything (note that the restric-
tion against backtracking counterfactuals is crucial here: if it were not, plausibly if
the value of Sun were different, then the value of Season would have had to have
been different too). But presumably these variables do depend on something—
they are probably not the basic first events of the universe. To pretend we have
isolated them, we can appeal to the contextual salience of local causes. Causal
explanation has to stop somewhere, and if a certain condition on the parentless
variables is satisfied, we should be prepared to stop with them. The simple con-
dition is that parentless nodes should not be correlated amongst themselves. (I
see this as a methodological condition on the construction of causal theories, not
some a priori truth about systems of variables.) There is one difficult case: if X
is counterfactually dependent on Y, and Y on X, neither through a backtracking
counterfactual, then we should try to find another variable Z which is parent to
both X and Y and screens off the counterfactual dependence. (However, there are
some cases where such a variable does not exist, for example in standard expla-
nations of the non-local correlations in Bell-type theorems in quantum mechanics
(Butterfield, 1992). This is perhaps best modelled by simply keeping the two-way
counterfactual dependence.)
Following naturally on from this, one can see how adding more variables can
change the parental counterfactual dependencies by interpolating further interme-
diate causes, and by adding new parents. This can mean that contextual salience
determines the causes of an event. So does the comprehensiveness of the underly-
ing theory that supports the counterfactuals. This feature tends to support the idea
that causation, as well as explanation, is often contrastive rather than absolute—it
depends on the salient variables.16
Third thing to note: consider the counterfactual we used to evaluate the par-
enthood relation. It relies on a seemingly miraculous ability to vary the value of
one variable while holding all others fixed on a certain value. This process has
gone under the name of an intervention in the literature. In the graphical models,
it can be modelled by severing the node from its parents and setting the value of
the variable and other variables, effectively rendering some dependent variable
independent. We are supposed to think of an intervention on X as encoded in a
causal graph C that terminates in the fixing of some value for X independent of
16Hitchcock (1996).
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other values of other variables not in C. 17, 18
The notion of an intervention is strongly counterfactual, perhaps involving a
set of models where the best system of laws might be different than the one gov-
erning the theory as a whole. One could think it was even a causal notion, and
hence that the account must be circular. I think that since the variables represent-
ing the intervention itself are typically outside the model, the charge of circularity
cannot be sustained. If we tried to make a global causal model, then serious diffi-
culties would arise when trying to show how causal interventions can be natural-
istically modelled in the same framework. One difficulty would arise when we are
forced to make sense of the notion of an intervention in non-causal terms—once
every event has a representative variable in the model, every dependence relation
between events is already represented.19 (I think this is exactly the point of Rus-
sell’s arguments in this context!) In any case, this way of thinking about causal
variables fits nicely with the manipulability account of causation that Woodward
has recently defended.20 But it can also be made to fit with other accounts (such
as the mechanical conserved quantity view of Dowe (2000)) insofar as those ac-
counts respect the modal claims that here I am suggesting are constitutive of causal
dependence in general.
Causation will be a relation between general type variables that can be instan-
tiated by many different particular events, and will apply in the single particular
17This isn’t quite right, because expanding some graph D that contains X to also contain C
would render C not perfectly efficacious in fixing X (C would no longer trump all other causal
factors).
18The viability of the concept of an intervention seems to depend on the possibility of modular
causal systems (Hausman and Woodward, 1999). These are systems where each variable in the
system has some independent exogenous sufficient cause. Cartwright (2002) has argued that mod-
ularity generally fails. However, she seems to rely on the claim that actually non-modular systems
are not possibly modular, and this claim seems false if one is willing to countenance counterfactual
variation in the patterns of occurrence of instantiation of distinct variables.
19Similar remarks have been expressed by Pearl (2000, 350):
If you wish to include the entire universe in the model, causality disappears because
interventions disappear—the manipulator and the manipulated lose their distinction.
He also seems to think (Pearl, 2000, §4.1) that interventions are to be connected with human free
will and the causal ‘unconstrainedness’ of human volition.
20In particular, the manipulability account of causation gives a nice way of motivating restric-
tions on the kinds of counterfactuals we consider to codify causal claims. The counterfactuals we
have considered, about the results of holding variables fixed while varying others, are naturally
thought of as modelled by hypothetical alterations of experimental situations. But some of these
antecedent situations are very hypothetical, and require very distant worlds to evaluate them.
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case only in a retrospective or derivative fashion. This is because we have iden-
tified causation with a feature of general models of phenomena rather than the
actual happenings that a model can apply to. Once we see the actual values of the
actual variables, then we can retrodict the actual effects various potential causes
had, through the light of particular assumptions about what the natural or usual
range of the exogenous variables is. We make a default causal model, to use the
terminology of Menzies (unpublished), and by using a mixture of default assump-
tions and evidence about actual values, we can create a restricted version of the
causal model that should give us the acceptable token causes for some particular
case. This will be a model that only applies to the single case in question. The to-
kens of events in question are something like Lewis’ versions of events: there may
be a smoking event, which has many actual versions that instantiate it. A help-
ful way to view the events is as coarse-graining the space of possible versions
of events.21 They are the union of a lot of different ways of some description of
an event being satisfied. The variables are mappings from events of some salient
type to numbers, such that in some cases an event which is in the domain of the
variable is not even a version of the characteristic event of the variable: the 0 value
of the smoking event is at best a ‘null’ version of smoking.22
Finally, what is the meaning of the arrows? An arrow between X and Y does
not mean simply ‘X causes Y’. Rather, it means something like ‘some values of
X are causally relevant to the values of Y’, where this causal relevance can be
at times stimulatory, at times inhibitory, and so on. This seems to nicely feed
into Hitchcock’s (2003) recent claim that what is metaphysically primary is the
multiplicity of causal connections, rather than some uniform notion of causation
that is supposed to apply to all cases. Consider that some of the arrows might
be purely inhibitory, some purely contributory, some a mix of both, and what
constitutes the ground of the counterfactual claim might be very different in each
case. Why think they can all be shoehorned into one neat causal metaphor like the
‘cement of the universe’? One consequence might be that the distinction between
21I thank Chris Hitchcock, Helen Beebee, Graham McDonald and Huw Price for suggesting
this way of viewing things to me.
22There is another sense of type here that may also have a role: this is that any particular event
may be an instance of a lot of different coarse-grained events, so that an actual particular event e
could be coarse event E1 and also the distinct coarse event E2. That is to say, particular events are
subsumable under many different causal models, and judging in a particular case which is best is
not altogether clear. There may not be a metaphysical fact of the matter, as will become clearer
below.
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a cause and an enabling condition will be harder to make in this framework.23
3. Determinism
Let us take stock. I think at this point we have a start on a framework for talk-
ing about counterfactual relations of dependence between convenient sets of local
events. We can see that Russell’s arguments depend in one sense on trying to give
a Carnapian explication of the causal relation in terms of relations and events that
physics makes available to us. We translate the talk of events into talk about the
global states that constitute those events, and we translate talk of causal produc-
tion into talk of laws of succession between microstates. In one sense all I want to
suggest is that this explication of causation is a bad one. We aren’t forced to map
events onto global states; and we aren’t forced to think that respectable science
must give us invariable laws of succession. We have a perfectly viable frame-
work for replicating causal talk as a certain pattern of counterfactual dependence
between variables which describe the salient localised possible events.
But we may be left with a worry that the reconstruction I’ve given doesn’t
really address the spirit of Russell’s arguments. I’ve argued that there is a certain
pragmatically necessary emphasis in the folk notion of causation on local events
and relations of counterfactual dependence between the theoretical representatives
of such events. But in a sense I’ve evaded the original worry. I’ve shown that if
we are content to give an explication of causation as it appears to us and in the
special sciences, then Russell’s claims don’t straightforwardly attach. A defender
of Russell’s arguments will respond that given some plausible theses about the
metaphysical primacy of physics and the claim that all facts supervene on facts
about the global physical state, the problem with causation is that its emphasis on
the local and the modal seems not to fit with the way we take the world genuinely
to be.
More slowly, the argument runs like this.24 If fundamental physics is to be the
ultimate arbiter of ontology, then only the relations it posits are to be accepted in
a correct scientific picture of the world. As Russell saw it, fundamental physics
captures all that can truly be said of the world. Do relations of counterfactual de-
pendence appear in fundamental physics? Only between the global states posited
by the theory, as determined by the functional dependencies encoded in the state
transition trajectories. And why are the global states important? Because they
23Thanks to Mark Schroeder on this point.
24Thanks to Gil Harman for help with this.
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give us the answer to every question we could pose about the system, and this
ambitious inclusiveness is exactly what we were looking for when we took phys-
ical facts to be those on which all other facts supervene. If we are to look only at
parts of the global state, we are at best making up approximations that we need to
propose in order to use our theories: we are no longer doing ontology.
Perhaps an analogy with objective chance is helpful. Almost everyone thinks
that, if determinism is true, then all objective chances are 0 and 1. Why? Be-
cause if microstates ‘really’ constitute the actual instances of events of a proba-
bility space, and the theory which posits them has deterministic state transitions,
then fixing an event will fix the future progress of the system through the state
space and hence through the event space. It is at best an epistemic feature of
macroscopic events that they seem to have non-trivial chances of coming about
or failing to come about. Russell might say here that the notion of chance has no
place in a scientifically respectable world view, but we don’t need to go that far.
All we need is that the place of chance in that world view is at best a redundant
summary of other facts, and not a genuine part of fundamental ontology. Models
which present the world as having objective chances are false.
The exactly similar response I imagine being made by a defender of Russell
with regard to causation. What we’ve shown is that if we take into account some
quite natural epistemic limitations on human agents, we are forced to admit that
we will be ignorant of the microstates that really constitute the world around us.
We thus have to resort to less epistemically demanding notions in order to get on
in the world. But these epistemically less demanding notions are simple but in
fact false descriptions of the underlying world. The facts of fundamental physics
simply are not structured in the way they would have to be for causal models to
even approximate the underlying reality.
Indeed, the very features of causation that we’ve discussed bear this out. Cau-
sation is context-dependent: it is sensitive to which events or variables are in-
cluded in the model, and some think it is relative to default values for the vari-
ables also. Causation is partial and local. If try to expand causation into a global
and context-insensitive (yet still categorical) notion, by adding in all the variables,
then it seems to evaporate. If it holds at all between global states, then it holds triv-
ially between every past event and every future event. And if it is not expanded,
then it is at best a poor approximation to what physics tells us more satisfactorily.
At least probability can have some kind of robust existence. If Reichenbachian
frequentists are right, then one has chances everywhere one has a sequence of
outcomes that can be partitioned and whose frequencies converge. Chance then
is merely a summary of what physics can tell us in more detail. But causation
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misrepresents genuine physical relations.
The really curious part is how all this connects up with determinism, the notion
that causation was originally supposed to go hand in glove with. We have now the
curious situation that non-trivial causation and determinism are at odds. Suppes
(1970) argued that causation re-appeared in fundamental science just when prob-
abilistic indeterminism at the microlevel became apparent. If there is no further
fact that fixes the value of some variable X, then different values that X could take
in some future evolution of the system will make a difference to further later char-
acteristics of the evolution of the system. But if determinism is true, then there is
always some further fact that fixes the actual value of any variable on every actual
event once some set of occurrent events is fixed. X can’t take different values,
hence can’t make a difference. Of course, if it had been different, then everything
would have been different. There is no sense in holding some things fixed and
letting other things vary if the determination relation holds between whole states.
4. Perspectivalism
We could evade this neo-Russellian argument if we could show that the positing
of these epistemically convenient and local relations (like the causal relation be-
tween variables) is not undermined by the fact that fundamental physics doesn’t
include them. There are a number of ways we could do this, some less plausi-
ble than others. One quite plausible way goes in two steps. First, see that the
reason theories get accepted isn’t always that those theories represent ‘fundamen-
tal reality’—sometimes, for example, what governs acceptance is the acceptor’s
perspective on the issues under consideration. Second, see that from within a con-
text where one accepts a certain theory, ontological questions about the status of
the entities and relations in the models of the theory are settled by that theory
itself—the content of that theory is the standard for correctness.25
Picking up on this idea of a perspective, Huw Price has defended a perspec-
tival approach to modal notions in science that I think can help us escape the
neo-Russellian argument for the elimination of causation (that because there is no
reduction of causation to the concepts of fundamental physics, causation should
be eliminated).26 The position I will defend applies a similar kind of perspectival-
25Carnap’s distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ questions is similar to this second point
(Carnap, 1956), but here I talk in terms of entities and models rather than rules for the manipulation
of expressions involving novel or doubtful terms.
26Particularly Price (unpublished); see also Price (1992, 1996, 2001).
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ism to causation, and will show why the approach to causation outlined above is
particularly germane to the pragmatist.27
The resurgent form of Russell’s argument that we sketched above rests on a
broadly realist and imperialist approach to the interpretation of scientific theories.
Scientific theories purport to be true and accurate representations of the way the
world is; and the genuine facts are entirely captured by the pronouncements of
some fundamental theory—in this case, fundamental physics.28
To resist this argument we need to resist this approach. The easiest motivation
for resisting it is to see just what it misses out. Firstly, it fails to account for
the fact that scientific theories are not merely or even primarily favoured for their
representation-derived features (like truth), and the respects for which they are
favoured (like explanatoriness) can undermine these features. Secondly, it fails to
account for the fact that the agents who use scientific theories have a particular
position in the world that influences the kinds of theories they propose and adopt.
This second point, suitably reflected on, gives us a start on a better understand-
ing of science. We begin by recognising that we are agents, trying to make our
way in the world. As such, we have a perspective on reality that reflects our sta-
tus as agents, hence as having goals and projects, capacities to accomplish some
of these and the resources to deliberate about how to best achieve them. It is no
surprise therefore that the concepts that we bring to bear in dealing with the world
reflect this goal-directedness and our consequent interest in effective strategies.
This is particularly apparent in the case of causation, which gives us a nice way
of systematising and approaching how we bring about effects and intervene in
systems to get them to behave in ways that are fruitful for us.
It is also no surprise that the kinds of things we take effective strategies to bring
about are salient and local events, and the interventions which effectively bring
them about are also salient local events. We are limited in the scope of our activity
and hampered by our merely partial control of its circumstances. Understanding
the causal relation is a matter of understanding how agents like us should wish to
systematise their views on how to characterise effective goal-directed activity in a
world where their agency is constrained in roughly the same ways that ours is.
This family of capacities that we possess gives us a perspective from which
27One difference between my view and Price’s is his emphasis on expressivism about discourse,
whereas I prefer to think in terms of pragmatism about theoretical content. But the views are
similar enough to deserve the same name.
28I will ignore the possibility of denying the claim that there is any fundamental level at all,
recently defended by Schaffer (2003).
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we engage with the world. From this perspective, the world presents relations of
causal relevance between events—that is, the models we correctly adopt of the
phenomena as they appear in our perspective posit causal relations between the
variables. To creatures who are not concerned with their effective agency, or who
are of such extent and duration that they need not be worried about locality, or who
are of such cognitive capacity that they need not worry about salience, the world
will look dramatically different: by which I mean that the models they choose to
adopt on the basis of their experience will be radically different than the models
we adopt.
We can posit some other perspective, a set of concepts from fundamental
physics for example, that will abstract away from the logical dependence of our
concepts on our limited purview. But we can’t make the mistake of thinking that
this other family of concepts will replace ours, or that they will make ours ille-
gitimate. Our concepts are legitimated by our practices and are valid within the
framework of those practices. That is, the standard for correct application of those
concepts derives from our practices and capacities, and when we engage in those
practices we are completely entitled to use those concepts—regardless of what
other practices might entail about them. Determinism and time symmetry, con-
cepts from fundamental physics, derive their legitimacy in turn from a particular
perspective, which characteristically attends only to global invariant features of
its subject matter. This perspective might not validate the concept of causation,
but no further perspective can adjudicate on the relative merits of these families
of concepts, except as they are appropriate or inappropriate for various tasks.
The realist may respond that relying solely on the pragmatic necessities of our
own agency to support the concept of causation is perfectly compatible with there
being no genuine metaphysical relation of causation. (The realist is apt to think
that, in failing to attend to global and invariant features, a causal perspective is
defective and hence not able to give a trustworthy account of genuine ontology.)
To respond to this worry we need to consider how to understand the talk of adopt-
ing a theory that we used two paragraphs ago: that is, adopting a particular set of
models of a phenomenon as a guide to that phenomenon. Our strategy will be to
show that a correct understanding of acceptance will give easily met conditions
under which the concept of causation is a perfectly legitimate part of an accepted
theory, and hence not suitable for wholesale elimination.
An appealing way, once we have introduced the users of a scientific theory
into the picture, is to understand the adoption of a scientific theory naturalistically.
That is, we have an account of the agents in question, and their requirements of
the theories that they use to guide themselves through the world. When combined
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with an account of the way the world genuinely is, this need not mean that the only
goal when adopting a theory is that it be true. Rather, theories are adopted because
they conduce the ends the agents have. A toy example might be this: agents who
are extremely cognitively limited might adopt the theory that best allows them to
get along in the world, which means a very simple theory they can actually use,
and not necessarily one that captures the world in all its complexity (in some sense
we are such agents).
In our case, we need a class of models that best fits with our particular cogni-
tive and epistemic features. The natural way to understand this is to look at models
of us and our use of theories: what Price calls a ‘meta-model’. I propose one par-
ticular meta-model. This model contains creatures who suppose, for the purposes
of effectively getting along in the world, certain theories. They make these sup-
positions in the context of diligent inquiry into the world, but that context has two
features: first, it presupposes that the appropriate model lies somewhere within a
set of possibilities which include the relations deployed by those creatures; and
second, consideration of particular projects and tasks can shift the context by al-
tering the legitimate presuppositions of the inquiry.29 But certain features of the
context are, though variable amongst different kinds of agents, fixed for each par-
ticular kind. These will be the psychological features of the agents, their particular
characteristic ways of approaching the world.
The meta-model describes what it is for such creatures to suppose a particular
theory in a context—it is for that context to leave open certain possibilities, the
very possibilities that the theory has as models, and for those possible events to
be taken as the relevant ‘outcomes’ which in turn are inputs to a process of ratio-
nal deliberation. In this case, the agents act as if the theory they accept is true;
from their perspective, the theory provides an all-embracing background for their
deliberation.
The crucial point for our purposes is that psychological and contingent features
of a kind of agent enters into the specification of the context. Therefore, theories
which leave out features that are present in all the possibilities consistent with that
context are poor candidates for acceptance.
Let us make what I take to be a very weak supposition: that scientific theories
are used to give explanations, make unsurprising already observed phenomena
and guide expectation about unobserved phenomena, in addition to describing the
world. Additionally, simple and comprehensive theories are often more accept-
able. Each of these virtues are not necessarily correlated with the likelihood of
29Stalnaker (1984).
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truth of a theory. If they nevertheless play a role in governing the acceptability
of a theory, which it is apparent that they do, then acceptability is not predicated
solely or even primarily upon accurate representation of the world. Rather, accep-
tance of a theory will depend on its satisfaction of these pragmatic and theoretical
virtues, and how well it fits with the background context settled by our particular
psychological stance as agents. This is particularly apparent if accurate repre-
sentation is regarded as independent of the psychological features and pragmatic
goals of the users of those representations: for then our particular context will
almost inevitably yield additional structure that our theories possess that do not
appear in the ‘agent independent’ representation.
An accepted theory governs the beliefs and actions of the agents who accept
that theory in exactly the same way as if they regarded that theory as truly rep-
resenting: one cannot accept a theory as non-representational. But a moment’s
reflection on the meta-model of the phenomena of these agents’ acceptance is suf-
ficient to show that any accepted theory is treated as true only in order to facilitate
the agents’ use of the theories in question. That is not to say, however, that there
aren’t contexts where representation is primary, for there are. The context of fun-
damental physics may be one; and so may be the context in which we inquire into
the naturalistic position of human agents within the physical world, as physical
entities with certain psychological features. So this position is not anti-realist, if
that means to deny the possibility of scientific inquiry having the primary aim of
truth. This position does claim, contrary to scientific realism, that being an ele-
ment of the ‘one true theory’ is not necessary for being an acceptable theoretical
element in contexts of inquiry which can justify our family of concepts, namely
those contexts we are inescapably embedded in which involve those concepts.
One particularly interesting feature of this contextual meta-model of accep-
tance is that for certain creatures, a purely representational theory would be both
impossible and inadvisable to accept. Impossible, because the serious open pos-
sibilities for such creatures (as partially determined by their psychological en-
dowment) do not include the possibility described by the representational model.
Inadvisable, because the kind of conceptual reform that it would require in order
to get such creatures into a state where acceptance of that theory was possible
would be of such magnitude and scope that it would render them unable to suc-
cessfully make their way in the world. A plausible meta-model of human inquirers
has it that we are such creatures, at least with respect to the notions of chance and
causation. Without either notion, we would be rendered incapable of deliberat-
ing and acting; but of course we could never seriously entertain the possibility of
jettisoning them either.
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In short: our cognitive abilities and pragmatic goals set a context for the the-
ories we accept which demands those theories be sensitive to, and do not under-
mine, the perspective we have on the world: the way the world seems to creatures
like us.30 This context makes legitimate our adoption of the ontologies those the-
ories encode, since we can neither escape it nor function effectively without it.
We act as if our adopted theories were representational, since that is a trivial con-
sequence of what it means to accept (and is a rational strategy for us to adopt
with respect those theories we use to guide our activity). However, in principle
we could ascend to a meta-model and discern that the model actually is one that
best satisfies our aims and goals, and may not be the best representation. Hence
correct representation cannot be the sole arbiter of ontology—there remains the
possibility that the item in question appears legitimately and irreducibly in another
accepted theoretical framework.
An example of this might help. Often, given our epistemic limitations, there
is a need to coarse-grain the set of states of a system: to summarise a complex
state by means of a probability distribution over a set of coarser properties.31 I
think that, given a context where a theory involving a particular coarse-graining is
accepted, it is correct to claim that if the theory works and provides explanations
and predictions, then what it proposes should be treated as existing. In particu-
lar, sometimes when we consider quasi-isolated systems with a particular coarse-
graining of the events of interest, the causal modelling framework described above
can have this status. Since this framework yields a number of causal relations, they
exist. Whether or not determinism reigns, for the kind of system in question this
approach is the best we have. Now, it just so happens that around here, quasi-
isolated systems are instantiated by deterministic systems. But that doesn’t mean
that there is no possibility that they might not be; nor does that impugn the fact that
approaching these deterministic systems in this way is methodologically sounder
than the alternative reductionist approach. That is to say, given the current con-
text, there is a serious possibility that the acceptable theories are indeterministic,
given what they claim about macroscopic quasi-isolated systems. To pretend that
there is no such possibility is to make a serious methodological error given the
particular perspective one operates within.32
30The way the world seems to us will include the entities and relations we project onto the
world in virtue of having cognitive capacities that are sensitive to particular patterns of correlation
of salient events.
31For a similar characterisation, see Strevens (2003).
32This example was suggested to me by Chris Hitchcock.
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In a sense, this is a fictionalist approach to scientific theorising. Instead an
‘according to the fiction f’ operator, we have an ‘according to the theory t’ oper-
ator that encloses all the direct assertions of agents in particular contexts. From
within a contextual perspective, just as from within a fiction, the world seems just
as the theory or fiction describes. When modelling creatures as users of a partic-
ular theory, what we do is answer the question why these creatures should find
it congenial to adopt the fiction in question. However, in denying the necessarily
representational character of scientific theories (when taken in isolation from a
context of acceptance), we are at odds with the fictionalist, since we can’t avail
ourselves of any context-free non-fictionalist approach to any theory. A model,
in the absence of a context for acceptance, cannot be regarded as describing any-
thing, for we have not fixed anything for it to attempt to match up to.
Price puts it nicely when he characterises the whole approach as republican
(in contrast to Russell’s ‘monarchy or anarchy’ ultimatum): once we see that ac-
ceptance of a model can be motivated partly by features of the agents who accept,
then the dichotomy between objectivism and eliminativism can be seen as incom-
plete. That a theory deploying a relation or object is acceptable in some contexts
and not in others indicates that the relation or object is not ‘real’ in some context-
independent sense. However, that does not indicate that the relation or object
must be eliminated, since by hypothesis it was acceptable in some context. Nor
can it be reduced without remainder to some context-independent notion, for the
same reason. The entity remains irreducibly perspectival, and yet remains a viable
component of a complete ontology. Agents needn’t be given authority to accept
a theory and its constituents by fundamental reality: lacking such an authority
they can provide it for themselves if their character and the available evidence is
suitable. Indeed, in some cases inescapable features of their situation demand a
commitment to entities that do not feature in fundamental reality.
5. Causal Counterfactuals and Deliberation
This has been quite general so far, but now I want to apply this perspectival frame-
work to the particular view of causation I defended above: that causal claims are
expressions of certain patterns of counterfactual dependence.
I’ve claimed that the feature of our perspective that causal claims latch onto is
our status as deliberating agents. In this, I follow Ramsey:
. . . from the situation when we are deliberating seems to arise the gen-
eral difference of cause and effect. We are then engaged not on dis-
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interested knowledge or classification. . . but on tracing the different
consequences of our possible actions. . . (Ramsey, 1929 [1990], 158)
We are trying to decide what to do in a world where our epistemic access is in-
herently limited to a local area. Even if there is no objective relation of causation,
there would be a use for one if, by using it, agents could mark effective ways of
achieving their goals. This would mean that causal claims had to provide an ef-
fective encoding for information about independence of one event from another
(to tell us what wouldn’t be effective). Causal claims would also need to give us
a quick way of seeing just which events depended on which others; and how the
patterns of dependence go. It should be clear that the causal networks of variables
linked by counterfactual dependencies satisfy both of these desiderata.
Other notions of causation, though they too might be able to be ensconced in
a broadly perspectival framework, are not going to have as close a connexion to
deliberation as the counterfactual framework. In some sense, hypothetical rea-
soning as represented by counterfactuals is constitutive of rational deliberation.
When considering what to do, we should maximise our expected utility. That is,
we should consider the possible outcomes that might ensue given our act and then
weight them by their subjective probability— that is, in our framework, what kind
of distribution over the variables a particular interventional setting of some par-
ticular variable would induce—and by their subjective value. Other accounts of
causation, like conserved quantity theories, have a much harder time getting this
modal hypothetical aspect of deliberation out of their actualist stance towards the
propagation of causal influence. Maybe they deal better on some other criteria,
but as it stands the deliberative aspect of our agency seems like the most plausible
feature of our perspective to ground the utility of causal models, and this account
of causation neatly latches onto this ground.
6. Conclusion
I think that we should resist the Russellian conclusion. Insofar as we need to put
constraints on our notion of causation, we have seen that it does not have a natural
home in a deterministic global microphysics.
However, the concept of causation can be naturally reconstructed in contexts
where the events we deal with are local and epistemically convenient. Indeed, in
such contexts it has decided advantages over the reductionist aspirations of fun-
damental physics. This is especially apparent once the demand that a complete
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ontology must only reflect perspective-independent reality is given up as incon-
sistent with our status as inquiring agents.
Draft of 23 October, 2003.
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